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¡y Pao¡Bss os Gnnc Mu¡vno
Scope
This article sets out the law
defining the insurer's duty to defend
undet liabilty policies in Montana
and the insured's dghts when the
insuret tefuses defense. It then spe-
cifically focuses on the insuted's right
to settle the case and assign the
insured's rights against the insurer
to the claimant in consideration for
a covenant not to execute on the
insured's assets.
The General Duty to Defend in
Liability Policies
The basic coverage agreement or
"gtant of coverage" in liability poli-
cies invadably contains twin promises
that the insurer will (1) indemnify the
insured for the damages for which
the insured is legaþ ltable and (2)
defend the suit even if the allegations
are groundless, false or fraudulent.l
The policies generaþ teserve to the
insuret the right and duty to defend
as it sees appropriate.2 However, in
Montana, under the Montana Su-
preme Court's landmark case In Re
Rules of Professional Conduct and
fnsuter Imposed Billing Rules and
Procedure (2000),3 the right is more
properþ descdbed as a right to p^y
for counsel to defend the insured and
whose obligation is to the insured
and not the insurer. The duty to de-
fend promised in the poJicies gener-
aþ ends when "our limit of liabiJity
fot this coverage has been exhausted
by payment of judgments or settle-
ments."4 Directors and Officers cov-
erage varies the way it promises
defense. Some policies have an ex-
press duty to defend while others
ptovide for reimbursement of de-
fense costs. Some that ptovide for
reimbursement may allow the insurer
to involve itself directly in the de-
fense at its discretion. The basic dif-
ference is in the insurer's ability to
dictate the defense. As part of the
obligation to indemnify, the D & O
policy promises to reimburse the
insured if the insured opts to defend
himself.s Genetally, the duty-to-de-
fend policies give the insurer com-
plete control over the defense of any
claim.ó Again, in Montana, that would
be an overstatement, since In Re
Rules of Professional Conduct places
signifìcant restrictions on the insurer's
right to control the defense of inter-
fere with the decisions of the lawyet
the insurer has selected to represent
the insured. Under the poJicies, if the
insured settles the claim, absent
breach by the insurer, he does so on
his own money, and cannot seek
reimbursement.T Moreover, by doing
so, he would breach his cooperation
clause with the insurer.s Nevertheless,
it is generally agreed that the insured
can negotiate settlement of his liabil-
ity above the policy limits.e
Birth of the Insured's Right to
Settle and Assign in Montana
The seminal case in Montana on
the insured's right to settle in the face
of the insurer's refusal to defend is
the Montana Supreme Court's deci-
sion in the 1923 case of Independeint
Milk d2 Cream Co. u. Aetna Ltfe Ins.
Co.lo Aetna Life promised to indem-
nify and defend the insured for liabil-
ity for personal injury suffered by
pefsons other than the insured's em-
ployees arising out of use of a cer-
tain truck. The policy also provided
that "the assured shall not voluntarily
assume any liability or interfere in any
negotiation for settlement or in any
legal proceeding, or incur any ex-
pense, or settle any claim, except at
its own cost, without the written
consent of the company previously
given, . .".11 Also, "clauseJ" of the
policy required that no action could
Jie against the insurer to recover any
loss ot expense uhless it was actually
paid by the assured "after actual ttial
of the issue."l2
The insured was sued for
$30,000 for serious injury caused one
John Ouimet arising from use of the
insured truck. However, Aetna Life
refused defense believing that
Ouimet was ân employee of its in-
sured which belief was denied in the
answer filed by the insured. Left
undefended, the insured settled the
suit fot $3,000 on advice of counsel
and paid the settlement. The insured
then sued Aetna Life for reimburse-
ment, and the jury in that trial deter-
mined that Ouimet was not arl
employee. Aetna Life appealed that
verdict and raised clause J on appeal
contending that it was only respon-
sible if the insured suffered a jury
verdict as opposed to a settlement.
The Supreme Court upheld the trial
court's denial of Âetna Life's motions
for nonsuit and for directed verdict,
and also deferred to the jury in its
determination that Ouimet was not
an employee.
Important to the jurisprudence
of insureds' settlements is the courts
pfonouncement in Indeþendent Milk dZ
Cream that the insurer's denial of
Jiability and refusal to defend consti-
tuted â breach of the policy which
"released the insured from its agree-
ment not to settle the claim without
the written consent of insurer and
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waived clause J of the contract which
had macle actual tnal of the claim a
condition precedent to a tecovery."13
To this day,Independerut Milk ù Cream
is still good law in Montana, and its
influence can be seen in every cluty to
defend case.
Nature of the Duty to Defend
The duty to defend is different
from the duty to indemnify, indepen-
dent from the duty to indemnify, and
broader than that duty created in the
same insurance conttact.la The duty
to defend arises when a complaint
against an insured alleges facts, which
if proven, would result in coverage,ls
or when the "insured sets forth facts
which represent a risk covered by the
terms of an insurance policy."16 The
duty "arises when the insurer,
through reference to pleadings, dis-
covery, or final issues declared ready
for triaI, has received notice of facts
representing a risk covered by the
terms of the policy."17
The decision whether the dury is
triggered is usually made by the in-
surer when it teviews the complaint
that starts the action.18 The insurer, in
comparing the aliegations of the
complaint to the policy coverage
language, must "consttue the allega-
tions in the complaint, resolving all
doubts about the meaning of the
allegations in favor of finding the
obligation to defend was "trig-
gered"'1e "The fundamental protec-
tive purpose of an insurance policy
and the obligation of the insurer to
provide a defense require that cover-
age exclusions be nartowly con-
strued.2o Any doubt about whether
coverage exists must be resolved in
the insuted's favor.2l The insurer has
the burden of proving that the exclu-
sion applies.22 Moreover, the Montana
Federal Court in Grindheirz¡ (1995)
quoted with approval a New York
court's assertion that " a policy protects
against poody or incompletely pleaded
cases as well as those atfuh drafted. . .
If, Jiberally construed, the claim is
v¡ithin the embrace of the policy, the
insurer must come forward to defend
its insured no matter how groundless,
false, or baseless the suit may be."23
The insurer must construe the
facts from the insured's perspective,2a
that being the perspective of a con-
sumer of average i¡¡¡elligence.2t "Un-
Iess there exists an unequivocal
demonstration that the claim against
an insuted does not fall within the
insutance policy's coverâge, the in-
surer has a duty to defend."26 Accord-
ingl¡ if there is a factual dispute
about coverage, it must be resolved in
favor of coverage for the insured.2T
If the insurer chooses to look at
facts beyond the complaint, it does so
at its own risk.28 When the insurer
receives a complaint anàf or ânswer
alleging facts within coverage it has a
duty to defend regardless of whethet
its teview can resolve the fact issues
against coverage. The insurer cannot
qake disputed factual determinations
to deny coverage. As the court said in
Staples (2004), "ff]hat is not a ques-
tion fot the insurer to answer unilat-
erally upon receipt of only the
complaint and f or ansv/er. That ques-
tion is reserved for the couft or the
jury)'2e Consequently, if the com-
plaint alleges facts that would "ex-
pose the insured to Jiabiïty covered
by thc policy, then the insurer must
defend the insured, even if the subse-
quent ultimate resolution of disputed
facts establishes that the event or risk
is not covered by the poLicy."3o There-
fore, if the question of covetage is
ambiguous, the cartier may be found
to have bteached the duty to defend
even though the court ultimately
finds there was no covetage.3l N7here
coverage facts are disputed, the in-
surer simply "canflot escape liability
by declaring in advance of tial that
the claim for damages is not one
covered by the pohcy."32
If, on the other hand, the allega-
ti.ons of the complaint demonstrate
that no coverage exists, the insurer
has no duty to defend and does not
need to do any further investigation.33
However, the obligation to defend
requires the insurer to not narrowly
construe its coverage provisions and
to interpret them from the perspec-
tive of its insured.3a
lf the complaint alleges facts
outside insurance coverage but also
facts inside the coverage, the insurer
must defend.3s If the insurer refuses
tender of defense in such a case, it
will be estopped from ultimately
denying indemnity on the claims
outside coverage.3ó Consequentl¡
such an estoppel rule can actually
create cor¡erage where none exists.3?
To avoid such estoppel and creation
of coverage where none would have
existed, the insurer can accept tender
of defense undet reservation of
dghts and îùe a declaratory action for
an order that no coverage exists.38
The downside of doing so for the
insurer is that it will bear the costs of
defense in the period between tender
and the court's ultimate declaration
that there is no coverage. However,
the insurer is in the best position to
beat that cost.3e
Insuter's Breach of the Duty to
Defend.
Hence, the Montana Supreme
Court in Staples Q004) warned that,
if the pleadings allege claims within
coverage, but the insurer believes it
has a legitimate reason to tefuse
defense, it should tender defense
undet reservation of rights, and fìle
a declarutory action.ao Äs Judge
Edckson said of the Supteme Court's
statement:ai
I remain amazed at the num-
ber of cases that have come
before this court and the state
courts in Montana over the
yeats where presumably so-
phisticated insurance compa-
nies have ignored this maxim
of insutance law at their peril.
To save the relatively minor
costs of tendering a defense
Pren22 Tnrer TnnNos - SPruNc 2012
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and commencing a dec. action,
these companies have exPosed
themselves to risk far in excess
of the policy limits at issue.
The reasoning behind this is
diffìcult to fathom,
If in doubt about whether it
must provide defense, the insurer
should continue undet teservation of
rights.42 If the insurer tefuses to
defend, it does so at its petil.a3 In any
event, the insuter will be estoPPed
ftom denying coverage, if it wrong-
fully tefuses to defend.a't
The insurer that refuses tender
of defense ioses control of the cle-
fense and is fully liable if coverage
existecl even if the insured's handüng
of the defense Preiudices the in-
surer.45 Consequently, the insurer in
refusing defense cannot later object
to the manner in which the insured
deFendecl so long as jt was in a rea-
sonable and proPer manner.46 The
insurer loses any right to be infcrrmed
of settlement offets or to insist that
the insured have its Permission to
scttle, inform it of trial strategy, or
relay copies of Pleadings.aT
The insured, on the other hand,
has the "full liberty" to decide
whether to try the case or settle it,
taking into account "likelihood of
success or failute, the cost, uncef-
tainty, delay, and inconvenience of
trial as compared to the advântages
of settlement."as This is all consistent
wìth basic contract lav¿ that 
^ 
panq's
material breach of the contract
relieves the other Party of al'
obligations under the contract.ae
ìØhere the insurer has wtongfullY
refused defense, the following sce-
narios may play out: First, the insured
may defend and lose a judgment.
Second, the insured maY defend and
win a defense verdict. Third, the
insured mây settle the case. In anY
ofle of those scenarios, the insurer
will be liable fot whatever damages
the insured incurted in judgments,
defense costs, interest, and costs.
The Insuted's Right to Settle bY
Confessing Judgment
The insured who has been denied
a clefense has the right to settle the
claim and enter an agreement under
which he assigns to the claimant his
rights against his own insuret and
negotiates in return a covenant not to
execute on the insured's assets.50 The
insured who is left on his own
doesn't have to defend himself to
continue coverage, but can aclmit
liability as long as he doesn't do so in
fraud clr collusion.sl "[A]n insured
who is abandoned by his liabilitY
insuret is free to make the best settle-
ment possibie with the third PartY
cla\mant, including a stipulated fudg-
ment with â covenant not to execute.
Provicled that such settlement is free
from fraud and collusion, the insurer
will be bound thereby."s2 The insured
can settle without litigating the cover-
age dispute rvith the insuter and with-
out prejudicing the insured's dghts to
litigate coverage.53 The insured can
âgree to default, ancl the iudgment
creditor carì use the estoppel against
the insurer even if that creditor did
not take an assþment of the
insured's rights against the insurer.
Consequentl¡ the insurer cannot
defend on the ground that the settle-
ment is rlot ân amount that it is "obli-
gated to pay" under the basic
insuring agreement.sa When the in-
surer .wrorlgfully refuses to defend, it
is simply bound by the iuclgment
against the insured.ss
The judgment can be enforced in
one of thtee ways:só (1) by assign-
ment of the insured's rights; (2) if
there is â staflrtory remedy, by bring-
ing an action under the statute; or, (3)
by a garnishment action. As can be
seen in the Montana cases, enforce-
ment by assigning the insured's rights
appears to be the favored remedY in
Montana.In consideration for the
confessed iudgment and assignment
of rights agatnst the insuret, the in-
sured negotiates for a covenant that
the claimant will not execute on the
insured's assets. This means the fudg-
ment will ultimately be collected, if at
all, from the insurer which denied a
defense. 'Absent ftaud, when an'
insured enters a stipulation to judg-
ment oï offers a confession of fudg-
ment it is enforceable against the
insufef."57
Insuredts Release from
Obligations Under the PolicY
By 1,923,IndePendent Milk dz
Cream Co. had established that the
insured is teleased from his obltga-
tions under the policy by the insureL's
bteach of the contrâct for failtue to
clefend. Hence, the insured is free
ftom the duties uncler any "coopera-
tion clause" that requires the insured
to cooperate or assist the insuret in
defending the claim. The breach also
ftees the insurecl from anY clause
prohibiting the insured from settling
the case or any Pat of it.58
Settlement âgreements entered
into by abandoned insureds generally
do not express the specifìc basis for
settlement.5e The insurer confronted
with the settlement after wrongfully
breaching the cluty to defend wiÌl
invarialfy argue fìrst, that the
insured's potential liability did not
justify the settlement, and second'
that the insured is responsible for
proving that it clid. However, the
insured need not Prove the case
against itself, and needs onlY show
that the allegations of the complaint,
alleging claims v¡hich have been com-
ptomised, are covered by the policy'60
Courts do not require the insured to
deny liabüity to the point of settle-
ment and then prove its liabiÌity in
order to secure coverage of the
settlement.6l So, the policyholder
"does not have to Prove de novo the
existence of damage in the underþ-
ing action; i.e., its own liability.62
To so tequite would Place on the
insured the burden of trying the
undetþing action in the coverage
hearing. This would deprive the in-
sured of the benefit it negotiated to
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avoid defending itself when aban-
doned by its insurer. The insured
does not need to establish actual
liability to the plaintiff in the underþ
ing case as long as "a potential liabil-
ity known to the insured is shown to
exist, culminating in settlement in an
amount reasonable in view of the
size of possible recovery and degree
of probabiJiq of claimant's success
against the insured."63
That the insured does not have a
burden to prove that liability justified
the setdement is important, because it
removes that issue from the declan-
tory aclion and, just as important,
should remove that issue from dis-
covery. The same insuter that denied
the insured a defense will become
very diligent about propounding
discovery to the insured in the cover-
age action on the question of
whether the insured made the dght
decision in settling and detetmining
the amount of settlement. The court
should protect the insured from such
discovety which is itrelevant to the
issues in the declaratoty action.
Left untethered, the creative
insurer will insist that all. of the facts
relevant in the underþing claim ate
now televant for discovety and trial on
the issue of "reasonableness" of the
settlement. The court in the declara-
tory action should be alet to avoid
such abuse. Moteover, the court and
parties must keep in mind that the
only evidence allowed on the coverage
issue is that which was available to the
insuter at the time of the settlement.6a
The only other relevant and admissible
evidence is that evidence probative of
issues of reasonableness and collusion.
Giving the Insurer Notice of
Intention to Settle
}l4orÍana does not requite the
insured to noti$r the catter that
refused to defend that the insured
intends settlement. However, it can
be good practice to do so, because
the insurer that has notice but does
not paticþate has, absent fraud or
collusion, Iikeþ waived any dght to
challenge the reasonableness of the
settlement.6s
Presumption that the Settlement/
Judgment Is Reasonable
In Independent Milk d2 Cream, the
court noted, "That the compromise
settlement effected by the tespondent
was fait and teasonable cannot be
questioned. . ." the implication being
that the settlement needed to meet
that standard.66 However, the coutt in
IndEendent Milk dv Cream C0,67 relted
on then Section 8169, Rev. Codes
1921 (now MCA 28-11-316) to estab-
lish a presumption that the settlement
is reasonable:
In the interpretation of a con-
ttact of indemniry the follow-
ing rules are to be applied,
unless a conffaty intention
appears: (a) The person indem-
nifying is bound on request of
the petson indemnified, to
defend actions ot proceedings
brought against the latter in
respect to the matters em-
braced by the indemnity, but
the person indemnified has the
right to conduct such defenses,
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if he chooses to do so; (5) If,
after request, the person jn-
demnifying neglects to defend
the petson indemnifìed, a re-
covery against the latter, suf-
fered by him in good faith, is
conclusive in his favor against
the former.
The coutt determined that the
burden of rebutting the presumption
that the insured's settlement was
reasonable is on the insurer,6s and
that is still good law in Montana
today.
Since Independent Milk dz Cream,
the consent judgment in Montana is
presumed reasonable unless procured
by fraud or collusion. This is logical,
because, under the policy, the insured
has no duty to defend and can de-
fault. Consequently, if the claimant
presents her case at an unopposed
triaI, the judgment would be enforce-
able.6e Justice Holmes, in the United
States Supreme Court's 1906 decision
in St. Loais Dressed Beef dy Prouision
Co. u. Mørltland Casaal4t Co,,7o rea-
soned, with regard to consent judg-
ment by the insured, that the insurer's
promise is to pay judgments "after
such precautions and with such safe-
guards as the defendant finsurer] may
insist upon."71 As Justice Holmes
pointed out, the insurer which refuses
defense "sav¡ fìt to insist upon
none. '-
Rebutting the statutory presump-
tion of reasonableness would be
most diffìcult. The insured is allowed
to take into account the likelihood
that the plaintiff would have tecov-
ered, the probable size of the recov-
ery, the tisks and costs of defending
the litigation, and the uncertainties of
the law and the facts.13 The courts are
more concerned with whether the
settlement was in good faith and fasr
than whether it reflects the exact
measure of damages.Ta ,{.n insured
may settle for a figure higher than
expected damages, because of the
excessive fnanital burden of defense
costs. This is especiaþ relevant in
cases involving claims against corpo-
rate insureds under CGL policies.
Such cases aÍe notorious for requiring
defense costs that often exceed the
indemnity liability limit and have
been the impetus behind the use of
defense within limits (DWL) Jiabiïty
policies which cap defense costs by
including them in the liability limit.Ts
,A.rguably, the insured's settlement
soon aftet denial of defense saves
defense costs \Ã/hich savings will
ultimately inure to the benefit of the
insurer which wrongfully denied
coverage.T6
Excessiveness of the judgment
cânnot logicaþ be judged by com-
parison of the amount for which the
insurer could or would have settled,
This is because the insurer is a "risk
neutral" negotiator which has, by the
law of large numbers and premium
income, allowed it to promise to
undertake defense and settlement of
the claim without dsk to itself. The
insuted is naturally "risk averse"
v¡hich is why it transferred any risk
of loss and risk of defense costs to
the insurer in return for a payment of
a premium. The insured knew that it
could not handle the risk involved.
Consequently, being denied coverage
means the insuted must deal with a
risk of loss and defense costs that it
knew would be ruinous to it in the
frst place.
For example, an automobile in-
suted cannot take any risk that she
will negligently cause an auto acci-
dent that results in death or setious
injury to another. The gravity of the
fìnancial risk would be ruinous even
if the probability is small. She is
deemed "tisk avetse." But the insurer
will accept transfer of that risk, be-
cause its thousands or millions of
auto insuredt puytng premiums allow
it to calculate the precise ptobabiJity
of accidents and the gravity of the
damages. This is known as the "law
of latge numbers." The insurer can
then calculate its administtative costs
and desired pro{ìt to set premiums
that allow it to take transfer of the
tisk. It becomes "tisk neuttal" and is
not negotiating to save its financial
life, This is wholly different from
the situation of the insured which
is denied defense and indemnity.
Depdved of promised defense and
indemniry the insuted is negotiating
to avoid financial câtastrophe, has the
poorest negotiating power, and must
do whatever it takes to free itself
from the loss that will cause it to
fìnancially capsize.
Insured's Right to Damages as â
Result of the Insurer's Breach
Breach of the contractual duty to
defend by the insurer entitles the
insured to fecovef "such damages as
wefe the natural and ordinary conse-
quence of the breach.l1 If the insurer
refuses to defend without justifica-
tion, it becomes liable fot defense
costs and judgments.Ts There is no
duty to mitigate damages in breaches
of contract,Te However, the contract
rule simply blocks one ftom ïecover-
ing damages which he could reason-
ably have mitigated.8o Nevertheless,
most courts have refused to apply
this mitigation rule in insurance cov-
erage breaches.sl Consequently, the
insured is not blocked from recover-
ing damages that could have been
mitigated by hiring alawyer and pay-
ing for defense.s2 Most coufts reason
that the carner that refuses a defense
assumes the risk that the insured will
eîter 
^ 
default judgment.s3
The insurer must pay the under-
þing judgment in full regardless of
whether it is in excess of the policy
limits.s4 r{lso, the insurer must pay
interest and costs.85 The Federal
District Court in Montana has held
in Nie/sen (2007) that interest is ap-
propriate on the amount of the un-
derþing judgment pursuant to 28
U.S.C. $ 1961(a) (2000),86 The Federal
Court noted in Nielsen that the
Montana Supreme Court and the
Ninth Circuit "also support this
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element bf da-ages"sz cidng
Montana's Lee Q004) decision and
the Ninth Circuit's 1991 decision in
Consolidated American Ins. Co. u. Mike
S oþ er Mørin e S erui ces.sP
Bteaching insutets have been
tiable for defense costs in Montana
since Independent Milk dv Cream Co. u.
Aetna Life In¡. Co. in 1923. Montana
case law clearþ provides that v¡here
the insuter refuses to defend a clatm
and does so unjustifiably, that insurer
becomes liable fot defense costs and
judgments."'8e ìØhere the insurer has
wrongfully refused a defense, the
court will a'ç¡atd attoÍney fees under
the Montana Uniform Declaratory
Judgment,A.ct, MCÂ $ 27-8-313. The
court established in Trøstees of Indiana
Uniuersiry u. Bøxbaøm (2003),eo and
Moanrain I%est Farr¡ Børeaa Møt. Ins.
Co. u. Brewer Q003),e1 that insureds
prevailing against insurers in UDJC
cases could recover their attorney
fees whete "necessary or proper,"
In Nie/sen,ez after determining that
attofney fees were recoverable, Judge
Molloy ordered the claimant's attor-
neys to file an affidavit "setting forth
in detail any atlorney fee's claimed
relating to this case" artd specificaþ
added, "Such afltdavit shall indicate
any contingent fees paid or to be paid
in the undedying case.e3 Recently, in
the State District Court case of
Newman u. Scott¡døle Ins. Co. and
National Union Fire Ins. Co.,ea Judge
Christopher awarded the judgment
creditor which successfully ptessed a
claim from an insured assigning its
rights against its insurer the full
amount of the 1/3 conttngent fee
entered into in the undetþing case.
This is logical, because the confessed
judgment has no value to the claim-
ant until her attorneys enforce it in
the declaratoty action fot coverâge.
Judgment in Excess of Policy
Limits
Montana clearþ allows recovery
in excess of policy limits as can be
seeà in Nie/sen.es There, the court
said, ". . . insurers who breach their
duty are liable for the full amount of
damages, including those in excess of
the insurance policy limits,"e6 In
Nielsen, the court pointed out that
breach of the indemnitor statute,
MC,A. S 28-1,1-31.6 (2005) makes the
breaching indemnitor liable for the
judgment rendered.eT Schetmets, in
their treatise, Automobile Liability
Insurance, report that, "Florida, Illi-
nois, I(entucky, Noth Carohna,
South Carolina, l7ashington and
Wisconsin decisions have held or
indicated that a wrongful refusal to
defend could cteate insurer liability
fot the entire excess judgment even
though an offer to setde v¡ithin policy
limits was not in the picture."es
Although not the rule in Mon-
tana, other courts hold that, absent
an earher demand for policy limits,
the amount that can be recovered
from the insutet as a result of a
consent judgment cannot exceed the
policy limits.ee It is argued that,
"neither the insured nor the plaintiff
has any right under the policy itself
to payment of such amounts by the
insufef."1o0 Moreover, the insurer's
policy limits ate not increased where
the insurer's only failure is refusal to
defend. As in other situations, the
insurer must have neglected a within-
policy-limits demand to be respon-
sible for ân excess judgment.lol
Nevertheless, the Montana
Federal District Court, in Nielsen,
established that enforcement of a
consent judgment does not require
that there was any settlement clemand
within limits of the insurer's policy
with the insured.ro2 The court in
Nielsen noted that the Montana
Supreme Court in the Lee decision,
". . . did not conduct a check to see
if a settlement offer was made."1o3
While this argument has been raised
by others,roa it is rejected in Montana.l0s
Montana's rule allowing recovery
in excess of the policy limits makes
sense, because the insurer which
defends and turns down an offer
within limits will be liable for an
excess judgment. Protecring insurers
which refuse to defend from excess
liability would be an incentive to
insutets to refuse to defend as a
way to avoid excess liability on big
damage cases.to6
Collusion or Fraud
In Nie/sen, the insurer sought to
avoid the $B million consent judg-
ment by arg-uing that it was, ". . .
improper due to collusion among the
attorneys. The court rejected the
defense saylng, "The proper time to
attack the alleged improper relation-
ships among the parties was during
the undedying lawsuit. Moreover, as
Judge Erickson found, Montana case
law does not impose a duty upon
courts to review the nature of the
underþing judgment where the
breaching insurance company failed
to defend its client." The court in
Nielsen noted that:
In I-¿e u. USAA Cas. Ins. Co.,
the Montana Supteme Cout
awarded the amount of the
confessed judgment, plus in-
terest, plus costs to the plain-
tiff where the insurance
company was in breach of its
duty to defend. x )r * The l-¿e
court did not conduct a review
of the propriety of the under-
þing judgment that it imposed
upon the defendant. + * * The
bottom line is when TIG ne-
glected to assume its duty it
assumed a risk. It is too late
to cry foul nowtoT
The court concluded in Nielsen:1lq
The duty to defend is broadly
applied for compelling public
policy reasons. Insurance com-
panies with legitimate ques-
tions can tender a defense with
a resetvation of rights. When
insutance companies fail to
comply with the law and the
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terms of their policies, the
courts àte not, and have not
been, required to go back and
check to ensute the company
was treated well when it re-
fused to honor its agreement
with its client. TIG's defenses
fail. The undedying judgment
constitutes pàtt of the damage
tecoverable here.
\ùØith regard to fraud, the insurer
may claim that the insured's confes-
sion of judgment is in direct conflict
with the insured's prior statements
denying any Jiability. This was the
situation presented in Staples where
the insured had denied in his original
answer that the subject horse was
on his property or in his care but
later confessed judgment in f¡vor
of the party injured by the horse.loe
There the court said, "He did noth-
ing more than concede that, given
the disputed facts, there was a risk
that a jury could find him at fault,
even if he continued to deny liabil-
ity."tlo A careful practitioner would
be well advised to insert a rcittal
along that line in the confessed judg-
ment to head off claims of fraud,
collusion, or a defense attempt to
rebut the statutory presumption of
reasonableness.
Exchanging the Assignment for
a Covenant Not to Sue
Generally, aspaLrt of the agree-
ment to enter an undefended judg-
ment, counsel will agree not to
execute against the assets of the
insured who confesses the judgment
with the expectation that the creditot
will only look to the insurance com-
pany for satisfaction of the judgment.
ln return, the insured assigns what-
ever rights he has against the insurer
by teason of the refusal to defend.
I7hile some courts have held such an
a:_rangemeÍrt to constitute a release,
the insuted who is left on his own to
defend can admit liability as long as
he doesn't do so in fraud or collu-
sion.111 The insuter's promise to pay
is not destroyed by the insured's
agreemcnt with the claimant not to
execute on the insured's assets.112
Cleady, in Montana, the insured can
negotiate such a covenant.113 In
Montana, the consent judgment is
presumed to evidence the insured's
liability on the undetþing cla)m,114
and the burden is on the insurer to
show that it is unreasonable, collusive
or fraudulent.lls The insured can
even confess judgment on a ground-
less suit in the face of threat of
expensive prolonged Jitigation.ll6
What Happens if the Settlement
Amount is Found Unreasonable?
If the insurer'were to meet the
burden of proving that the settlement
is not reasonable, what should hap-
pen? Montana decisions do not
^ppear 
to provide an answer. Logi-
cally the possibilities are: (1) the court
could impose a qæe of remittitur
where the insured could agree to an
amount the coutt found reasonable
or have the settlement rescinded and
the case teinstated for trial; ot (2) the
court could simply rescind the settle-
ment and reinstate the matter for
tial; or (3) the court could exonerate
the insuret. Exonerating the insurer
would make no logical sense and be
unjust, assuming there has akeady
been a determination that the original
refusal to defend was wrongful. It
would Jikely cause insurers an itresist-
ible urge to put endless effort into
attempting to show that any settle-
ment.was unreasonable. It has been
argued that, if the plaintiff lost his/
her entire claim when a court found
the settlement unreasonable, plaintiffs
would moderate their settlements
accordingly.ltT S(/hile such a draco-
nian tule may in facthave that effect,
it lacks any tationale.
The Minnesota Supreme Courq
inAlton M. Johnson Co. u. M.A.I. Co.
(1990),118 reasoned that the fairest
option in the face of an unenforce-
able stipulated settlement was to
rescind and reinstate the matter fot
trial. The benefìt of imposing a rype
of remittitur as an afternative to trial
is pute convenience for the parties
and the coutt.
Facts in the Montana Cases
The facts of Independent Milk ú
Cream Co. u. Aetna Life Ins. Co. (1923)
were telated eadter in the article.
Because the Montana Supreme
Cout's Staples Q004) and I ¿e (2004)
cases, and the Fedetal Disttict Court's
Crindhein (1995) and Nielsen Q006)
cases, are so important in the devel-
opment of the remedies for failute to
defend, it is good here to recount
their facts.
A.. Grindbeim a. Safeco Ins.
Co. (1995\re
In Grindheim, the plaintiffs
claimed injury from disposal of hu-
man and atrìmal waste by their neigh-
bor, the Deerfìeld Hutterite Colony.
Safeco refused tender of defense of
the suit undet its farr.:' and ranch
liability policy on the basis of its
pollution exclusion and on the
ground that there wâs no covered
"occurrence" or accident, the pollu-
tion being deliberate. Faced with the
potential costs of defense and liabil-
ity in the case, the Deerfield Colony
settled the case by confessing judg-
ment for $500,000, assigning the
Colony's rights as insurecl against
Safeco in satisfaction of the judg-
ment, and accepting a covenant flot
to sue ftom Grindheims.
Grindheim then sued Safeco in
federal court to enforce the consent
judgment as assþees of the
Colony's tights for bteach of the
insurance contract and breach of
the duty of good faith and fau deal-
ing. Grindheim brought a second
action in federal district court seeking
attorney fees, costs, costs of temedia-
tion, and costs of preventing future
damage which action was consoli-
dated with the action to enforce the
judgment.
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Judge Hatfield found that Safeco
owed a duty to defend, that it
breached that duty by nartowly inter-
preting its coverage agreement, and
that the Deerfìeld Colony was en-
titled to all the damages it sustained
as a result of Safeco's breach.12o This
case is the soutce of much of the law
cited throughout this article.
B. Farmers (Jnion Mut. Ins.
Co. a. Staples (2004)121
In Stap/es, Farmers Union Mutual
Insurance Company (FUMIC) in-
sured Corcotan as the named insured
under a ranch liabiJity poJicy and
also covered as an additional insured
any non-business person legally
responsible for Corcoran's animals.
Huntsingers suffered serious injuries
when their car struck a horse named
Frencþ on aroad near Havre. Own-
ership of the horse was unclear and
in dispute, and it was thought that the
horse came ftom Staples's property
when the accident occurred.
Huntsingers sued Staples who fìled a
tkttrd parqr complaint and a later
amended complaint each alleging that
Corcoran was apart owner of the
hotse, which would mean FUMIC's
policy would cover Corcoran as the
named insuted and Staples as an
additional insured. However, FUMIC
unilaterally determined for itself that
Corcoran v/âs not the ownet of the
horse and tefused defense of Staples
as an additional insuted.
Left without coverage, Staples
confessed judgment in favor of
Huntsingets acknowledging evidence
from which a jury could fìnd him
liable for Huntsingers' damages.
He then assigned his rights to
Huntsingers in return for a covenant
not to execute. FUMIC filed a de-
clantoty action seeking a declaratton
that it had no duty to defend or in-
demnify Staples and that the judg-
ment he confessed was void. On
cross motions for summary judg-
ment, the trial court determined that,
under the allegations of the com-
plaint, FUMIC had a duty to defend,
but that, on the facts developed,
Corcoran did not own the horse and
could not give permission for the
horse to be on Staples's properry, so
that Staples was not an additional
insured.
The Montana Supteme Court
reversed the District Coutt's conclu-
sion that Staples was not an addi=
tional insured and upheld that court's
conclusion that FUMIC owed Staples
a duty to defend on the pleadings.122
The Supreme Court held that FUMIC,
having unjustifìably refused to de-
fend, was estopped from denying
coverage so that Staples was entitled
to summary judgment. Of great im-
portance is the precedent established
that, whete thete is a fact dispute on
covefage, the insuter cannot make
itself the adjudicator. It must defend
on the allegations of the complaint
and let the coutt ot juty adjudicate
the coverage fact dispute.123
C. Lee ú. USAA Ca*Ins. Co.12a
InI-¿e u. USAA, Lee individuah
owned a vehicle insured with State
Farm. She and Hoss bought a 1988
Acura together so that they co-owned
two vehicles, Hoss promised that if
Lee would drop her insurance with
State Farm, he would add her as a
named insured on his USAA poÌicy
with $100,000limits. Hoss failed to
insure her, and she was subsequently
seriously injured âs a passenger in a
taxt cab. Lee recovered the $10,000
BI limit from the negligent tortfeasor.
I ee sought UIM benefits in a suit
against USAA which she lost. The
Montana Supreme Court upheld the
verdict in favot of USAA on the
ground that Lee never was a named
insuted.l2s Lee then sued Hoss under
his BI coverage for breach of his
verbal ptomise to Lee, asserting that
she had been damaged by detrimen-
tally teþing on Hoss's promise. Hoss
tendered defense to USAA which
refused and denied any duty to defend
or indemnify. Hoss then confessed
judgment for $284,500.
Lee and Hoss sued USAÂ fot
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indemni{ication under the standard
básic coverage agreement which
contained the broad ptomise that,
'rWe pSA,\] will pay damages for
BI þodily injutyl. . .for which any
coveted person becomes legally te-
sponsible because of an auto acci-
dent." The coverage ptovision
contained ten exclusions none of
which excluded JiabiJity arising out
of breach of contract.
The trial court found for Lee and
Hoss awarding $100,000 to Lee with
intetest and costs and $184,500 to
Hoss with interest and costs. The trial
court also rejected USA.r\s defenses
of res judicata and collateral estoppel.
The Montana Supreme Court
upheld the lower court and ruled that,
because there was no BI coverage
exclusion for breach of contract,
under the broad language of the
basic coverage agreement, USAA
owed a duty to defend and indemnifii
and had to pay the excess judgment
of $184,500 over the $100,000 limit.
The court also held that there was no
collateral estoppel because the prior
issue, whether Lee was a named in-
suted for UIM coverage, was differ-
ent from the issue of whether USA.Â
had a duty to defend and indemnity
Hoss under the BI coverage.
D. Nielsen 1). TIG fns. Co.'26
In Nielsen, the employer,
Confluence Expeditions, L.C., was
sued for negligent failure to warn
others of the poor driving record of
its employee, David Hanna.Hanna
caused serious injuries to plaintiffs in
àÍt avto accident. Confluence was
also sued for breaching a duty to
ptohibit Hanna from transpoting
plaintiffs. The suit against Hanna and
Confluence was defended by the auto
insurer that covered the auto, but
Confluence also tendered it to its
CG,L carrier,TlG Insurance Com-
pany for defense and indemnity. TIG
refused coverage on the basis of an
exclusion for damage adsing out of
"ownership, maintenance, use or
entrustment to othets" of an auto
owned by Confluence.127
After sending three letters tender-
ing defense, Confluence advised TIG
in a letter that, in order to protect
itself, it might agtee to an entry of
judgment in return for a covenant not
to execute and a possible assignment
of its rights. Plaintiffs and Confluence
settled the case and, by agreement, set
a hearing at which the damages were
detetmined. Confluence agreed in
advance not to contest the amount
established at the hearing "unless the
proof offered or damages requested
is collusive, fraudulent, or improper."
The court held a two hour hearing
and after headng concluded that
"Plaintiffs were entitled to in excess
of $8 million in damages."
Judge Molloy held that TIG had
a duty to defend in the circumstances.
He rejected as "disingenuous" TIG's
argument that Confluence breached
the coopetation clause, because of
the correspondence that revealed the
company repeatedly tendeted the case
for defense, forwarded pleadings, and
kept TIG informed of Confluence's
necessity to settle, noting that under
Staples, "alL rhat is required is notice
of the pleadings."128
Conclusion
Montana courts, like others
across the nation, rigorously enforce
an insurer's duty to defend. They
resolve coverage determinations by
liberaþ construing coverage in favor
of the insured and narrowly constru-
ing exclusions. They u/arn that the
insuret which denies coverage does
so at its own pedl.
Nevettheless, Montana case law
is legion with decisions holding that,
where the facts of the complaint do
not implicate coverage, the insurer
need not do further investigation and
has no duty to defend ot indemnify.
On the other hand, if the insurer
wrongfully tefuses defense, even if in
good faith, it has breached the policy
contract and fteed the insured to fend
for himself. The insured has no duty
to defend himself in the fìrst place,
and. may settle the case and assign
any dghts he has against the insuter "
to the claimant in return for the
claimant's covenant not to execute.
Such a settlement is presumed rea-
sonable and not collusive. Subsequent
challenges of the settlement by the
insurer with the duty to defend,
should focus more on simply whether
the settlement was collusive or
fraudulent.
The dsk averse insured who has
been denied defense and indemnity
by its dsk neutral insurer is in a peril-
ous and often financially ruinous
position witlr no bargaining power
save for trading away whatever dghts
he has against the insuter that has
wrongfully denied defense. If the
insured can negotiate a settlement
figure that is not collusive or fraudu-
lent and is based on considerations
of such things as risk of Jiability and
the costs of attempting to defend, the
insuret will be liable for the con-
fessed judgment. This is so even if
the insured negotiated a covenant not
to execute on the insured's property
in return for the assþment. It is
also ttue regardless of whether the
insurer acted in good faith in denying
defense in the ftst place.
The insuter will be estopped
ftom raising defenses it could have
taised in the undedying action and
v¡ill be estopped from raising other
coverage defenses. Ultimateþ in
Montana, the insurer will be liable for
the undedying ot confessed judg-
ment, the insured's attorney fees and
costs expended in defending the
underþing claims, interest on the
judgment and attorney fees in the
coverage action that are recoverable
under the Uniform Declantory
Judgment Act.
As can be seen, the insurer that
denies coverage when it depends on
disputed facts does so at its own peril
and can suffer dire consequences. The
remedy for the insurer is to provide
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defense under tesetvation of rights
where coverage is disputed and file a
declaratory judgment acúon to ascer-
tain that there is no coverage. The
insurer has little to lose in taking this
safe route. There are far more cases in
Montana where the courts have held
that allegations of a complaint fall
within a clear exclusion to coverage
and therefore do not invoke any duty
to defend ot indemnify, thus reJieving
the insurer of any further duty to
investigate, defend or indemnify.
'ü7'hen the breach of duty to de-
fend issue is uied, the only questions
are (1) whether there was coverage
on the facts and allegations known by
the insurer at the time it denied cov-
erage, (2) whether the settlement
entered into by the insured was in
good faith, and (3) whether it was
collusive. The settlement is presumed
fau, and the insured need not prove
its liability in the underlying case.
Moreover, the court should not mea-
sure teasonableness of what the risk
averse insuted was forced to do by
what a dsk neutral insurer would
have negotiated.
For the most part, there is noth-
ing unusual or unfair to insurers in
Montana's remedies for the insured
wrongfully denied defense. Courts
across the country have traditionally
protected insuteds from the risk that
their insuret will wrongfully deny
them defense. There is much logic
and justice in how Montana courts
have treated wrongful denial of de-
fense ever since Independerut Milk dv
Cream Co. u. Aøna Life Ins. Co. n 1923.
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